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Kant, Freedom as Independence, and Democracy
Christian F. Rostbøll, University of Copenhagen
While the inﬂuence of Kant’s practical philosophy on contemporary political theory has been profound, it has its source
in Kant’s autonomy-based moral philosophy rather than in his freedom-based philosophy of Right. Kant scholars
have increasingly turned their attention to Kant’s Rechtslehre, but they have largely ignored its potential contribution to
discussions of democracy. However, Kant’s approach to political philosophy can supply unique insights to the latter.
His notion that freedom and the public legal order are coconstitutive can be developed into a freedom argument for
constitutional democracy. This freedom argument goes beyond freedom as moral autonomy and a libertarian idea of
freedom as noninterference to a notion of freedom as a form of standing constituted by the public legal order. The
trouble with other attempts to connect freedom and democracy is that they have operated with a moral ideal that is
independent of a public legal order.
The practical philosophy of Immanuel Kant has had aprofound inﬂuence on contemporary political phi-losophy. However, it is only in the last few years that
commentators have moved beyond Kant’s autonomy-based
moral philosophy to in-depth treatments of his freedom-
based political philosophy. Contemporary Kant scholarship
suggests that Kant’s philosophy of Right has a value of its
own and that it should not be understood as a mere ap-
plication of his moral philosophy (Pogge 2012; Ripstein
2009; Willaschek 2009; Wood 2002). Thus, there are theo-
retical resources in Kant’s Rechtslehre, or the “Doctrine of
Right” (the ﬁrst part of The Metaphysics of Morals), and in
his political essays that go beyond those found in his moral
philosophy. Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom (2009) is
an exemplary work that both demonstrates the uniqueness
of Kant’s legal and political philosophy and indicates how it
can enlighten contemporary debates. However, Ripstein’s
work is also remarkable for its absence of a discussion of how
Kant’s political philosophy and his conception of freedom
can contribute to the discussion of democracy.
My aim in this article is to establish that and show how
Kant’s approach to legal and political philosophy can supply a
unique contribution to the discussion of democratic authority.
At the core of Kant’s political philosophy is the idea of the
juridical state (der rechtliche Zustand) as a system of equal
freedom. In the current literature, it has been emphasized how
Kant regards a public legal order as constitutive of freedom as
independence or of the equal standing of citizens in relation to
one another. Legal and political institutions are not mere
instruments “for securing a result that can be described in-
dependently of them” (Ripstein 2009, 218). I suggest that this
Kantian insight can be extended to a discussion of democratic
institutions and political rights: Democracy should not be
regarded as a moral ideal that can be understood indepen-
dently of legal and coercive institutions. From the perspective
of Kant’s philosophy of Right—as opposed to a purely ethical
perspective—we must evaluate democracy as part of a public
legal order or a constitutional system. Ripstein and others have
focused on a public legal order as necessary for freedom, but I
go further to consider why, from a Kantian perspective, de-
mocratic rights must be part of this legal order.
It is a fundamental Kantian idea that morality, including
Recht, concerns “not what we should bring about, but how we
should relate to one another” (Korsgaard 1996, 275). What is
special about political and legal philosophy, from a Kantian
perspective, is its focus on how formal institutions and law
relate citizens to one another. This has implications for howwe
approach the question of the moral importance of democracy.
Today it is common to ask about “the value of democracy,” as
if we were looking for some beneﬁt that democracy affects.
This is true of both instrumental and noninstrumental ar-
guments for democracy. Some noninstrumental arguments
even regard democracy as something citizens might enjoy or
prefer (Anderson 2009). To the Kantian, this is the wrong way
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to assess political legitimacy. The Kantian is concerned about
what might (or might not) make it obligatory to establish
democratic rule, independently of our preferences for it. Self-
avowed noninstrumental arguments for democracy tend to
look for a value of democracy that is actually external to de-
mocracy, such as justice or equal treatment (Rostbøll 2015b). A
Kantian noninstrumental account opens up the possibility of
ﬁnding the moral importance of democracy in something that
cannot be fully conceived independently of the idea of a dem-
ocratically organized public legal order. Thus, the core Kantian
contribution is to suggest that we should not look for how de-
mocracy realizes a value that can be conceived independently
of democratic institutions; rather, we should consider whether
and how a democratic public legal order constitutes something
of moral importance.
Freedom as independence or the standing of not having
another person as a master is what, ideally, is realized by a
constitutional democracy. It might be thought that Kant’s
conception of external freedom (when properly distinguished
from moral autonomy) is exactly a type of freedom that does
not require democratic self-legislation and that does not lend
itself to the type of noninstrumental argument for democracy
that I propose. In addition, it might be objected that a Kantian
could not see majority decision making as constitutive of
freedom, because it makes the majority the master of the mi-
nority. However, these objections have a partial understanding
of democracy and of what is required for seeing democratic
rights as morally required. Insofar as Kant was in favor of
voting rights and the majority principle at all, he clearly was so
only as part of a constitutional system with representation, the
separation of powers, and protection of individual rights.
However, this does not mean that democratic rights are not
morally important, but only that they should be seen as part of
a larger constitutional system. For a Kantian it is the public
legal order, as “a system of laws for a people” (MM, 6:311),1
which should be a system of equal freedom. This is exactly the
virtue of the Kantian approach and not a vice.When we speak
of the moral importance of democracy, there is no reason to
speak of the value of unfettered collective self-legislation, direct
democracy, or simple majoritarianism. This is not what mod-
ern democracy is, and this is not what we argue for when we
attempt to give noninstrumental and/or freedom arguments
for democracy. Thus, when I suggest that Kant can contribute
to the discussion of the moral importance of democracy, I
mean the legitimacy of modern, constitutional, and repre-
sentative democracy. To be clear, I speak of the latter in ideal
terms and do not mean to imply that actual, existing democ-
racies are systems of equal freedom. Indeed, actual democra-
cies can and should be criticized from the perspective of the
Kantian ideal.
I begin with a reconstruction of Kant’s notion of freedom
as independence, distinguishing it from moral autonomy
and connecting it to positive law. This reconstruction is nec-
essary for three reasons. First, many commentators still in-
discriminately regard all Kantian arguments as autonomy-
based arguments, which is why we need to distinguish more
clearly between Kant’s approach to ethics and law. Second,
explaining the internal relationship between freedom and law
is critical for understanding why a Kantian would not ask
about the external value of democracy and for developing his
noninstrumental approach to law and politics. Third, many
objections to “freedom arguments” for democracy still hold
on to a libertarian idea of natural freedom or freedom as
noninterference. From this point of view, it is impossible to
show anything but an empirical relation between freedom and
democracy (Berlin 1969, 129–31). Following the analysis of
the internal connection between freedom and a public legal
order, I discuss whether and why democratic rights and rep-
resentation ought to be part of a constitutional system of equal
freedom. In particular, I analyze Kant’s thoughts on republi-
canism and representation. The last part of the article indi-
cates how the Kantian approach to law and politics can con-
tribute to a current discussion in democratic theory. I reveal
how some of the hesitation to accept freedom arguments for
democracy relies on a failure to consider the unique Kantian
approach to freedom and authority.
FREEDOM, NOT AUTONOMY
Readers of Kant’s moral philosophy will most likely associate a
Kantian idea of freedom with the idea of giving laws to oneself
(Kant 1996a, 4:433, 440). This notion of autonomy seems to
connect directly to democracy, as an ideal of citizens being
simultaneously authors and subjects of the law. However, the
Kantian notion ofmoral autonomy is not workable as the basis
of an account of political obligation, and we need the latter in
our discussion of democratic authority. Political obligation
concerns the state’s moral right to rule and the citizens’ obli-
gation to obey the laws (Simmons 2002). The latter means that
citizens must accept as valid and morally binding even laws
withwhich they disagree. But a person cannot regard laws with
which he or she disagrees as an expression of her moral au-
tonomy, as Robert Paul Wolff (1998) demonstrated some
time ago. This is part of the reason why we, in a discussion of
democratic authority, which requires an account of political
1. References to Kant will be given with volume and page number of
Kant’s gesammelte Schriften (Kant 1900–). “MM” stands for The Meta-
physics of Morals, “PP” stands for “Toward Perpetual Peace,” and “TP”
stands for “On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but
It Is of No Use in Practice.” For translations, see Kant (1996a).
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obligation and which realistically cannot depend on consensus
on every law, should not rely on Kant’s notion of moral au-
tonomy, but need the notion of freedom as independence. We
need a notion of freedom that is directly related to the legal
form and coercion.
The Metaphysics of Morals begins with an important
distinction between ethics and Right (Recht; MM, 6:213–14,
218–21);2 moral autonomy belongs to the former, freedom as
independence to the latter. The core difference between
ethics and Right, between internal freedom or autonomy and
external freedom or freedom as independence, is that only
the latter is internally connected to coercion. Indeed, in Kant,
the authorization to use coercion is internal to the concept of
Right and to external freedom (MM, 6:231). Moral autonomy
requires that one act rightly for the sake of acting rightly. This
is not a form of freedom that can be enforced, because this
would entail that one acts rightly because one is forced to do so
rather than doing it from duty. Being externally free in the
sense of freedom as independence does not require any speciﬁc
incentive (it does not require that one acts from duty), and
because it concerns the external harmony between the choices
of a plurality of persons, it is enforceable. Right and external
freedom are social in a waymoral autonomy is not and depend
on external and positive coordination (Willaschek 2009, 64,
67). As such, coercion from the outset is not a threat to free-
dom as independence as it is to internal freedom or moral
autonomy.
Note here that in giving oneself the moral law, one is
immediately subject to it as an expression of one’s own in-
sight into what is right and wrong. The individual person can
become morally autonomous by an act of internal willing.
This way of realizing autonomy is not possible in politics that
makes use of positive law. Jürgen Habermas (1998, 257) has
suggested that “the positive character of law forces auton-
omy to split up in a peculiar way” and “makes it conceptually
necessary to distinguish the role of authors who make (and
adjudicate) law from that of addressees who are subject to
established law.” This split is a consequence of the fact that
public law entails setting up a coercive authority, which
enforces the law on subjects from the outside. Consequently,
positive law cannot be seen as a form of internal willing on
the part of the individual person. For Habermas, this implies
a distinction in politics between private and public auton-
omy, while I suggest that we move entirely beyond an ideal
of autonomy to the idea of freedom as independence. The
positive character of law combined with the possibility of
disagreement and the right to equal freedom that makes
disagreement morally salient force us to give up grounding
political legitimacy in autonomy.
Freedom as independence stands at the core of Kant’s legal
and political philosophy. “Freedom (independence from being
constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can coexist with
the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law,
is the only original right belonging to everyman by virtue of his
humanity” (MM, 6:237). This only innate right of humanity is
intimately connected to the Universal Principle of Right, the
basic principle of Kant’s Rechtslehre: “Any action is right if it
can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a
universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each
can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a uni-
versal law” (MM, 6:230). It is important to note that the
Universal Principle of Right is not directed to the individual, in
the same way that the categorical imperative of Kant’s moral
philosophy is, but is a principle for the right ordering of the
public legal order (Pogge 2012, 82). We turn to Kant’s phi-
losophy of Right exactly to ﬁnd principles for the state rather
than for individual, moral action.
In the Rechtslehre, then, Kant understands freedom as a
question of not having another person as a master. As such, it
is an ideal of being one’s own master, but it is essential not to
confuse this ideal with a positive conception of freedom that
sees freedom as a character ideal asserting the value of self-
mastery (Berlin 1969, 131–34). The positive freedom ideal of
self-mastery concerns the relation the person has to herself,
while the ideal of not having another person as a master is an
ideal for how persons should stand in relation to one another.
This is part of what it means to say that freedom as inde-
pendence is an external freedom rather than an internal
freedom. Freedom as independence is not an ideal of internal
willing, but an interpersonal notion of not being subordinate
to other persons’ choices. Not being subordinated to another
person’s choice means being able to use one’s own powers for
one’s own purposes. The state respects citizens’ freedom in
this sense, as far as each is independent to follow and use her
own powers of choice compatible with others’ right to do the
same. Citizens’ independence is violated when others decide
on their behalf what their purposes should be. Therefore,
independence is not an ideal pertaining to the content of the
lives citizens ought to live, but, rather, a principle designating
the relation in which citizens should stand to one another.
This clariﬁcation is important to note in order to avoid the
objection to the sectarianism and paternalism of positive
conceptions of freedom. Freedom as independence does not
dictate a mandatory form of autonomous life that some peo-
ple reasonably reject.
The idea that freedom as independence is a norm that
regulates relations between a plurality of persons, rather
2. I follow the convention among most English commentators of ren-
dering the noun Recht, which can denote law, justice, and right, as “Right.”
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than an ideal for the content of the lives of these persons,
connects to another signiﬁcant characteristic of this con-
ception of freedom: It is a norm that must be respected
rather than a good that should be promoted or maximized.
Freedom as independence is a standing that cannot be seen
as maximized or promoted, instrumentally, by a public legal
order; rather, it is constituted by it. The standing of being
one’s own master does not depend on the goodwill of others
but on legal rights and on a public legal order. This legal
order or constitution must have a speciﬁc form in order to
constitute a system of equal freedom. Before we get to the
form of the legal order, however, we must understand why
Kant thinks freedom is internally connected to positive law
and a constitutional order in the ﬁrst place.
THE PUBLIC LEGAL ORDER AND FREEDOM
A distinctive feature of Kant’s notion of freedom as indepen-
dence is its internal connection to a public legal order or a
juridical state (rechtlicher Zustand).3 More speciﬁcally, the
innate right to freedom is not a moral ideal speciﬁed inde-
pendently of the idea of a plurality of persons living under a
common, coercively enforced legal order. Legal institutions,
therefore, cannot be seen as mere instruments to the realiza-
tion of the right to freedom (Ripstein 2009, 9). I explain this
point further in a moment, but I want ﬁrst to mention that its
internal connection to coercion and law seemingly makes it
both easier and harder to connect freedom to democratic rule.
It makes it easier because freedom as independence is not a
notion of freedom that rejects all coercive rule, which would
make it incompatible also with democratic rule from the
outset. More precisely, the internal connection between free-
dom and rule opens up for noninstrumental arguments for
democratic rule. However, the internal connection to coer-
cion also distinguishes freedom as independence from Kant’s
own notion of moral autonomy, which might be thought to be
more easily connected to a demand for democracy, because it
is an ideal of self-legislation.
In Kant, then, the right to freedom cannot be deﬁned
independently of the idea of a plurality of persons living
under a common, coercively enforced legal order. Freedom
as independence concerns what it means to be free among a
multitude of people whose choices and actions may obstruct
one another. It is not possible to conceive of this freedom
independently of the assurances given by a public legal or-
der; that is, it is not possible to think freedom for a multitude
of persons in space without thinking the rule of law as a
system of positively enforced individual rights. This insight
of Kant’s relies on the claim that a public legal order estab-
lishes a common will that through reciprocal coercion up-
holds universal laws of freedom. Only by submitting to a pub-
lic legal order can a multitude of human beings whose choices
inevitably affect one another avoid being dependent on the
unilateral will of another.
Freedom as independence concerns the external freedom
of agents whose actions may obstruct one another (MM,
6:307, 311). The right not to be constrained by the choice of
another relates to the obstruction to one’s own choices that
others’ choices may affect. The only way that my external
freedom can be secure is if other persons’ potential inter-
ference with my choices is obstructed. Because freedom as
independence concerns external freedom and not incentives,
it can be regulated by coercion; and because freedom as in-
dependence requires assurance and security of freedom, “as
a hindering of a hindrance to freedom,” it requires coercion
(MM, 6:231).
However, it is not only my freedom that is to be protected
but also the equal freedom of everyone. Kant never speaks of
freedom as independence as a matter of not being obstructed
in doing what one wants or as a general right against inter-
ference, but always as the right to freedom under reciprocally
enforced and universal laws. “Right is the limitation of the
freedom of each to the condition of its harmony with the
freedom of everyone insofar as this is possible in accordance
with a universal law” (TP, 8:290). The “principle of innate
freedom already involves . . . innate equality, that is, inde-
pendence from being bound by others to more than one can
in turn bind them; hence a human being’s quality of being
his own master (sui juris)” (MM, 6:237–38).
The reason why freedom as independence involves equal-
ity is that the issue is not the empirical likelihood of being
secure against interference, but, rather, the normative or
categorical one of not being dependent on some particular or
private will for the ability to pursue one’s ends. The only way
to achieve this moral end is to set up a common will that
reciprocally coerces everyone, and thus one’s freedom is de-
pendent on this will (the public legal order) rather than any
private will. This also means that freedom as independence
cannot be understood as a beneﬁt I can enjoy on my own
(as noninterference is); rather, freedom is a matter of how
persons occupying the same space stand in relation to one
another.
The public legal order, therefore, should not be seen or
evaluated as something that bestows some independently
identiﬁed beneﬁt on the individual person. Rather, the con-
stitution is something that relates citizens to one another in the
3. Kant’s notion of the rechtlicher Zustand is the predecessor of the
later idea of the Rechtsstaat, which in English can be translated as a state
under the rule of law or a constitutional state (Byrd and Hruschka 2010,
25–28). I shall also use “public legal order.”
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normatively required way. Ideally, it relates citizens to one
another as independent beings, that is, as persons with
purposes of their own.
The public legal order, for Kant, is not merely a causal
means to realize the right to freedom, but, rather, in a deep
sense, constitutive of freedom as independence. This consti-
tutiveness lies in the fact that general, public, and enforced
laws bestow on citizens a standing in relation to one another.
The rule of law neither assures the individual that she will
not be interfered with (law will interfere with her actions if
they are not compatible with the equal freedom of everyone)
nor ensures that she will get what she wants (others may use
their independence to take or compete for the same objects
of desire); rather, it assures everyone a legal standing that
means “that they may enjoy what is laid down as right” by a
common will (MM, 6:311). To enjoy what is laid down as
right by a common will means not being dependent on the
will of another for realizing one’s choices. Youmight say that
one is dependent on the common will for getting what one
wants. But a common will that establishes what is right, in
Kant, does not have purposes of its own that one is forced to
follow. Recht, as we have seen, can have no other aim than its
intrinsic quality of securing the equal freedom of everyone.
The Universal Principle of Right entails that freedom can be
limited only for the sake of freedom. Thus, the standing of
which the rule of law is constitutive is a standing of being a
person whose freedom can be limited only for the sake of
freedom.
The distinction between a private or unilateral will and a
common, public, or omnilateral will plays a crucial role in
Kant’s notion of Right. It is not the number of persons shar-
ing a will that determines whether it is a private or a common
will, but, rather, how the will has been formed and what it
wills. A private will lacks institutional form or procedures for
its formation, and it has a particular end as its object. “The
omnilateral will is different, because all that it provides is a
form of choice, by providing procedures through which laws
can be made, applied, and enforced” (Ripstein 2009, 196).
Thus, the common will represents the public legal authority
or the constitution (MM, 6:311). Dependence on a private
will violates freedom because a private will has purposes of
its own, while the dependence on a constitution is a pre-
condition of freedom as independence, because it establishes
“a collective general (common) and powerful will” (MM,
6:256) that harmonizes the free choices of each without
having purposes of its own.
To grasp the uniqueness of the Kantian approach and its
potential contribution to the issue of democratic authority,
we should stress that the standing connoted by freedom as
independence is not a matter of freedom as noninterference
(Berlin 1969, 122); nor can it be reduced to or identiﬁed
with respect for equality. The standing connoted by free-
dom as independence cannot be understood in terms of free-
dom as noninterference, because coercion is itself consti-
tutive of this standing. Freedom as independence refers to
the security and assurance of independence of persons whose
actions might affect one another, because they live side by
side, and who can achieve independence only by the stand-
ing that coercive law affords them. To be sure, this standing
does imply a form of respect for equality, but it is a speciﬁc
form of respect for equality that is explained in terms of the
norm of nondomination. Indeed, part of my argument is that
we cannot fully understand the idea of respect for equality
without an idea of free persons, and therefore an equality
argument for democracy is incomplete without the freedom
principle.
To understand further why law is not a mere means to
freedom, note that positive law for Kant is not remedial or a
response to our fallen condition, as in much natural law
thinking. It is not because human beings are egoistic or fail to
do what morality requires that law and coercion are neces-
sary. “On the contrary, however well disposed and law-
abiding human beings might be . . . before a public lawful
condition is established individual human beings . . . can
never be secure against violence from one another, since each
has its own right to do what seems right and good to it and
not to be dependent upon another’s opinion about this”
(MM, 6:312). The important point here is that law, in Kant, is
not an unfortunate but necessary remedy or a limitation but,
rather, an expression of freedom. Recht, as Ripstein (2012, 44)
puts it, “is required because human beings are capable of
setting and pursuing their own purposes. That capacity is not
a limitation; it is our humanity itself.”
The fact that there is a connection here between freedom
as independence and respect for humanity does not mean
that we collapse freedom as independence into moral au-
tonomy. Kant (1996b, 6:26–28) deﬁnes humanity as the
capacity of setting ends for oneself and not as the capacity
to be morally self-legislating (Rostbøll 2011, 349–50). Thus,
Recht and freedom as independence are connected to respect
for the purposiveness of human beings but are independent
of the idea of moral self-legislation. Kant’s notion of Right as
a coercive regulation of the external relations among citizens
entails that, in politics, we cannot achieve autonomy as an
ideal of internal willing.
While the Kantian argument is that rational beings can
accept the rule of law as an expression of respect for their
capacity to set ends for themselves, rather than as a mere
means for maximizing their interests, respect for humanity
should not be seen as a good we should expect the indi-
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vidual person to prefer. It is, rather, a norm rational beings
cannot reject without contradicting their own rational na-
ture. A rational agent can object to being forced for the sake
of some end, but “a rational agent cannot object to being
coerced for the sake of freedom itself. . . . A rational agent
has nowhere to stand to reject it” (Hodgson 2010, 799).
Thus, while freedom as independence is based on respect for
humanity, this cannot be understood as a (sectarian) good; it
is, rather, something we owe one another as rational beings.
By this, I do not mean to say that we as private persons
owe it to each other to uphold relations of freedom as in-
dependence. Kant’s point is exactly that such relations can
exist only within a public legal order under a public will.
However, Kant does think that individuals have an obli-
gation to establish a state and that we “do wrong in the
highest degree by willing to be and to remain in a condition
that is not rightful” (MM, 6:307–8). Thus, it is a moral
obligation to establish a public legal order under which
alone everyone can have standing as free and independent
beings.
The right to freedom, then, is grounded in a speciﬁc
conception of the subject who is to be free. For Kant, it is
grounded in the normative distinction between a person
and a thing. A person is characterized by having purposes
of her own, and the right to freedom is the right to be and
live as a person. Without this idea of what a person is, it is
difﬁcult to make sense of the way in which Kant under-
stands the right to freedom and why Recht is not a mere
means to the satisfaction of interests. His whole “Doctrine
of Right” builds on the idea that there is a difference be-
tween respecting someone as a purposive being and
protecting or maximizing her interests.
In the negative freedom tradition, from Hobbes (1998,
139–40) to Berlin (1969, 122–23, 128), freedom is a ques-
tion of not being hindered in achieving one’s goals or in
satisfying one’s desires; as such, it is an ideal of freedom as
nonfrustration (Pettit 2012, 64–67). Freedom as indepen-
dence cannot be understood in this way. The view that
freedom concerns getting what one wants makes the extent
of freedom dependent on what purposes one has, and Kant
rejects that freedom depends on the content of one’s pur-
poses. Moreover, we are hindered by others in many ways
in achieving our purposes, without our freedom for that
reason being limited. Freedom as independence requires
only that we not be subject to the choice of another (that we
are not forced to pursue his purposes rather than our own),
not that we are independent of the effects of the choices of
others (Hodgson 2010, 810–12; Ripstein 2009, 33, 77). In
addition, the standard understanding of negative freedom
assumes that interference as such is inimical to freedom
and that law limits freedom. But, as we have seen, the co-
erciveness of law is constitutive of freedom as indepen-
dence. Freedom as independence is a matter neither of
getting what one wants nor of minimizing coercion. Rather,
it is about having a certain standing in relation to others.
This standing requires the certainty, predictability, and
reciprocity of law or Right as “that relation of human beings
among one another that contains the conditions under
which alone everyone is able to enjoy his rights” (MM,
6:305–6).
The preceding contrast to freedom as nonfrustration
shows once again that freedom as independence is not
about promoting some good from the perspective of the
individual, be it nonfrustration or noninterference. Rather,
the Kantian notion of external freedom designates a rela-
tion among persons. Notice that the idea that freedom as
independence expresses a relation between persons is not
the same as saying that “it limits the class of freedom-
restricting obstacles to those created by other persons.”4
Rather, it is to say that the question of freedom should not
be approached from the perspective of the ﬁrst-person
singular, but from the shared perspective of “a multitude of
human beings [who] affect one another” (MM, 6:311). This
is a valuable idea for thinking about democratic legitimacy,
insofar as the latter also should not be approached from
what the individual from her own perspective can gain, but,
rather, is a question of how a plurality of persons who
inevitably affect one another ought to be related.
REPUBLICANISM AND REPRESENTATION
Until now, I have focused on the connection between ex-
ternal freedom on the one side and a public legal order on
the other side. That is to say, in Kant we ﬁnd an argument
to the effect that a system of equal freedom can be neither
fully conceived nor realized without the related idea and
reality of a legal system with reciprocal coercion of external
acts. This, however, does not yet bring us to an argument in
favor of constitutional democracy. Thus, we must now note
that Kant does not think that law and force are sufﬁcient
for freedom, which is clear, for example, in Anthropology
from a Pragmatic Point of View, in which he writes that law
and force without freedom are despotism (Kant 2007,
7:330–31). It is evident that in Kant, and we shall see this in
the present section, the public legal order must have a
speciﬁc form in order to combine law and coercion with
freedom. My argument is that the issue of form is essential
4. Ian Carter (2008, 61–62) thinks that the latter makes freedom as
noninterference a relational notion.
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for a Kantian approach to the understanding and justiﬁ-
cation of constitutional and representative democracy.
While Kant’s views of external freedom, law, and coer-
cion are well developed, his comments on different forms of
government are relatively sparse. However, he does express
some clear positions.5 The clearest position is in favor of
republicanism, which for him is “the political principle of
separation of the executive power (the government) from
the legislative power” (PP, 8:352) and of both from the
judiciary (MM, 6:316–17). A republic, Kant writes, is the
only form of government “which makes freedom the prin-
ciple and indeed the condition for any exercise of coercion”
(MM, 6:340). This is the case because only republican
government establishes public rather than personal au-
thority, an omnilateral will rather than a unilateral will, or
the rule of law rather than rule of (a) particular person(s).
Thus, it turns out that the public legal order that we have
discussed above in rather general terms must take the form
of republican government.
What do republicanism and separation of powers have
to do with democracy? According to Kant, “the form of
government”—republic versus despotism, separation of
powers versus no separation of powers—is more important
than “the form of sovereignty,” that is, who exercises sov-
ereignty: one, the few, or the many (autocracy, aristocracy,
or democracy; PP, 8:352; MM, 6:338–39). Moreover, for
Kant, it is essential to distinguish a republic, a form of
government, and democracy, a form of sovereignty. In Kant
“democracy” refers to direct democracy, and he regards it
as “necessarily” despotic, because when everyone is part of
the sovereign, there can be no separation between those
who give the rules and those who apply the rules (PP,
8:352). Insofar as we are interested in the meaning and
authority of modern democracy, which is representative
and constitutional, we need not worry too much about Kant’s
disparaging comments on democracy, which refers to direct
democracy with no separation of powers. Indeed, I think
that it is crucial to understand the uniqueness of constitu-
tional and representative democracy and that Kant’s Rechts-
lehre is a valuable resource in this regard.
The core issue for Kant is that the form of government is
one that establishes a common will that differs from a
merely private will. In order for the system of government
to do this, it must be a constitutional system that provides
legal procedures for the formation of a common will that
goes beyond mere willing on behalf of a part of the pop-
ulation. The problem with direct democracy is that “it es-
tablishes an executive power in which all decide for and, if
need be, against one (who thus does not agree), so that all,
who are nevertheless not all, decide; and this is a contra-
diction of the general will with itself and with freedom”
(PP, 8:852). The point here is not that the use of a majority
principle is necessarily despotic—indeed, Kant proposes a
majority principle as necessary in face of disagreement (TP,
8:296–97)—but that the use of majority decision as the sole
principle and mechanism of government is so (Mulholland
1990, 325).
Equal freedom, then, is not secured by voting and ma-
jority rule alone but requires a constitution that establishes
an impersonal public authority. This is required not be-
cause of the imperfect nature of men or of majorities but
for categorical reasons. That is, only a constitutional system
with separation of powers is designed for impersonal rule
and respect for freedom as independence. Under direct
democracy or simple majoritarianism, some (the minority)
will be subject to the will of others (the majority). This is
not the case in the republican system envisioned by Kant.
Here everyone is subjected to a constitutional system. Citi-
zens are dependent on this system and the common will
that it establishes and not on the will of particular indi-
viduals, including the majority.
In order to establish an impersonal public authority, the
government must be representative. “Any form of gov-
ernment which is not representative is, strictly speaking,
without form” (PP, 8:352). A government with form is one
with a constitution, which provides procedures for the
formation of an omnilateral will. Kant’s objection to direct
democracy is exactly that it has no form and does not go
beyond rule by a private or unilateral will. It lacks insti-
tutional procedures and standards for forming a will that all
citizens can see as their common will, and it is thus “a
contradiction of the general will with itself and with free-
dom” (PP, 8:852). As we have seen, freedom as indepen-
dence cannot be understood independently of a common
legal order. Insofar as direct democracy and simple ma-
joritarianism are and can be realized independently of a
public legal order or a constitutional system, they are with-
out the form required by freedom as independence. The
form required by freedom as independence is one in which
the law speaks not only for some of the people but for the
people as a collective body. This requires that we see law not
as a product merely of the will of the majority but, rather, as
a product of the constitutional system.
From a Kantian perspective, we should not ask about the
value of, for example, voting or majority decision making
5. There are some differences between “Theory and Practice,” “Per-
petual Peace,” and The Metaphysics of Morals regarding voting rights and
preferred form of government (Byrd and Hruschka 2010, 175–79; Ludwig
2009). My concern is the ﬁnal form of Kant’s argument.
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independently of the constitutional system of which they
are a part. What we should inquire into is the moral im-
portance of the political-constitutional system in its en-
tirety. Is this system one that expresses respect for the
purposiveness and equal freedom of all citizens? What is
required by such a system to realize equal freedom? In this
way, we also avoid the misleading criticism of noninstru-
mental freedom arguments for democracy that (implicitly)
assumes we are defending democracy without form or
constitutional checks.6 This, too, is a reason to turn from
Kant’s autonomy-based moral philosophy to his freedom-
based political philosophy. Democracy as a purely moral
ideal fails to connect to the procedural, institutional, and
coercive aspects that are central for a Kantian legal and
political philosophy the core of which is the external free-
dom of persons whose actions must be coordinated and
who might disagree on how. Finally, focusing on consti-
tutional and representative democracy has the advantage of
relating to what we actually mean by “democracy” today.
DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION
I have argued that from the perspective of freedom as in-
dependence as the core norm of a public legal order, there
are good reasons to embrace representation and separation
of powers. What is not yet clear is why, from this per-
spective, representation has to be democratic; that is, why it
has to include the opportunity for all adult citizens to vote
and run for ofﬁce, free, fair, and frequent elections, ma-
jority decisions, and the other aspects of representative
democracy.
Kant writes, “The legislative authority can belong only to
the united will of the people” (MM, 6:313). He explains this
conclusion with the principle volenti non ﬁt injuria (no
wrong is done to someone who consents). He writes also
that freedom is “the attribute of obeying no other law than
that to which he has given his consent” (MM, 6:314). While
these formulations suggest that consent does matter to
Kant, we cannot derive an argument for democratic rep-
resentation directly from them. That, I think, would lead us
back to an autonomy model, which fails to take adequate
account of how a system of equal freedom for a plurality of
persons who affect one another depends on coercive law,
which must be enforced also when unanimous consent
cannot be secured. In addition, if the volenti principle and
consent were the core of Kant’s system, he would have only
pragmatic reasons for advocating a representative system as
opposed to direct democracy. But that is clearly not the
case. Kant is giving a principled argument for representa-
tion, and that is what makes his thoughts unique and
valuable for a discussion of modern democracy.
To advance the argument for democracy, we must re-
turn to the earlier point that freedom as independence is
not a norm that can be fully conceived without the idea of a
plurality of persons living under law. Ripstein rightly argues
that Kant’s approach to authority and validity of law is
noninstrumental and nonepistemic. That is, the authority
of the state or the legitimacy of the constitutional system is
not based on its ability to produce correct results, as mea-
sured by some external epistemic standard. However, when
it comes to the democratic ideal of collective self-legislation,
Ripstein writes, “the idea that the people are the authors of
the laws that bind them is thus a formal rather than ma-
terial idea. . . . Positive legislation is only legitimate if it
could be a law that free persons could impose on them-
selves” (2009, 213; emphasis added). The latter is an epi-
stemic standard that is external to the legal rights of citizens
and actual procedures of decision making. It is a standard
for what ought to be decided that says nothing about the
actual procedures of decision making and of who should be
included in them.
Discussing the same issue, Cristina Lafont (2012, 280–
85) argues that the validity of law in Kant is not a purely
epistemic issue and that the actual consent required by the
volenti principle confers independent validity on law and
government. While my argument concurs in the point that
in Kant we can ﬁnd theoretical resources to show that the
validity of law is not merely a matter of its substantive
correctness but is inherently procedural and depends also
on the possibility of expressing consent, I do not think we
can explain this in the way suggested by Lafont. She argues
that what explains majority rule and democratic inclusion
in Kant is the volenti principle: Citizens do not need to
consent to each law, but the volenti principle is satisﬁed
because citizens have voluntarily consented to be bound by
the collective decision made by the majority of citizens. In
support of her interpretation, Lafont quotes “Theory and
Practice”; but what Kant says in the quoted passage is
that the principle of majority decision must be regarded
“adopted as with [als mit] universal agreement and so by a
contract, [and the latter] must be the ultimate basis on
which a civil constitution is established” (TP, 8:296–97).
Kant immediately adds that the original contract that es-
tablishes the constitution cannot be presupposed as a fact
but is “only an idea of reason” (TP, 8:297). Textually, it is
abundantly clear that Kant does not require that citizens
voluntarily accept the constitution, and as a practical
matter, constitutions and procedural issues are also objects
of disagreement and thus cannot be said to be something to6. See the section Freedom and Democracy below.
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which citizens have given actual, unanimous consent, which
is what Lafont’s argument requires. Thus, she still operates
within the autonomy logic. The argument from freedom as
independence does not require, as do autonomy arguments,
actual consent to the democratic procedures or to majority
rule; the latter is not what explains why those who disagree
with the correctness of the outcome must still regard it as
legitimate in my argument. Rather, representative, consti-
tutional government is justiﬁed because it is the only form of
government that is designed to respect citizens’ equal free-
dom, both as subject to law and as makers of law.
Yet, there are two important insights in Lafont’s argu-
ment: that political legitimacy depends on the constitutional
system as a whole and that consent has independent value. It
is the constitutional system, as a system that designates
procedures for lawmaking as well as the limits of law, that
secures freedom rather than majority rule in and by itself.
This is not because we have consented to the constitution but
because the latter is constitutive of a system of equal free-
dom. Actual consent is important not for the justiﬁcation of
this system as a whole, but it is so as one element within the
system. In other words, what gives the constitution authority
is not consent, but part of the legitimacy of particular laws
arises from the possibility of citizens to express consent
through voting. Moreover, legitimacy of particular laws
emanates not only from the consent through voting but also
from the fact that the laws are made within a system that is
designed to respect the equal freedom of all citizens.
While Kant was no supporter of universal suffrage, he did
think voting as a form of consent was essential for being a
citizen and for public Right (TP, 8:295; MM, 6:314–15). He
writes that the government must represent the people “in
order to protect its rights in its name, by all citizens united
and acting through their delegates (deputies)” (MM, 6:341).
Moreover, when he writes about republics being less likely to
go to war (the famous democratic peace thesis), Kant clearly
speaks of actual consent, of “when the consent of the citizens
of a state is required” (PP, 8:350) and when citizens “must . . .
give their free assent, through their representatives” (MM,
6:345). If Kant did not think consent mattered, he would not
have made voting part of being an active citizen and an es-
sential element of public Right. There are good reasons to
believe that Kant’s principles support universal adult suf-
frage, while his own opposition to it was contingent and
provisional (Maliks 2014, chap. 3; Weinrib 2008). Be that as
it may, my concern is whether and why the Kantian ap-
proach to public Right and the core principle of freedom as
independence require consent through voting, as an essen-
tial element in the constitutional system of equal freedom, if
not as the legitimating principle of the system itself.
It might be said that the purposiveness of human beings
cannot explain why the right to vote ought to be part of the
constitution, since the purposiveness of human beings can
be protected by civil rights alone. However, Kant’s notion
of freedom as independence is about more than the pro-
tection of the purposiveness of the individual seen in iso-
lation from others. It is about the standing of a plurality of
interconnected human beings in relation to one another. In
addition, the denial of the right to vote for representatives is
an affront to one’s standing in the sense of freedom as
independence. If one does not have the right to dismiss
one’s representatives in free elections and to express one’s
opinions and have them heard and included, one will be
subject to others’ choices and be “dependent on another’s
opinion about” what is “right and good” (MM, 6:312).
We should understand political and democratic rights in
relation to the Kantian idea of a commonwill. For a will to be
common, it must provide procedures of choice that secure
that no one is dependent on the private will of another. But
only if it is the procedures that determine who should decide
and what should be decided could we say that everyone is
dependent on these procedures rather than on some
preprocedural or private will. Thus, it is only under demo-
cratic procedures where everyone has inﬂuence on who
decides and what is decided through the vote and public
judgment that the common will is truly procedural. If who
decides is determined independently of or prior to actual
procedures of decision making, which is the case in non-
democratic regimes, some will be dependent on the will of
others rather than on shared procedures of decision making.
Still it might be asked, if one has the same rights to express
one’s opinions in a constitutional monarchy as in a de-
mocracy, wouldn’t a subject in the former type of regime
have the same standing as a member of the minority in a
democracy who also does not make the decisions? No,
clearly the standing of ordinary citizens in the two regimes is
different. Even if you are allowed to exercise critical judg-
ment in a constitutional monarchy, if your voice has no
weight in decision making, your standing is not equal to
those who make political decisions. In a representative de-
mocracy, the opinions and judgments of everyone are
solicited not just in order that others can make more in-
formed decisions on the behalf of everyone but also to de-
termine whose opinion and judgment should prevail. The
essential difference between democracy and nondemocratic
regime forms is that only in the former does no one inde-
pendently of the political process itself need to surrender to
the will of another. Members who turn out to be in the mi-
nority in any given case must obey the decision of the ma-
jority in a democracy, but this does not mean that they are
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dependent on the will of another; it means only that their
opinion failed to carry the day in a process in which no one is
dependent on each other’s choice. What everyone but the
ruler(s) is subject to in nondemocratic regimes is a will that
one can only hope to inﬂuence but never be part of, a will that
one is dependent on no matter what happens in the political
process. In a democracy, by contrast, one is subject only to a
will everyone is equally free to form; the democratic will is
not given independently of the political process. Because the
voice of everyone in a democracy is counted, and always, in
principle, could become part of the decision-making ma-
jority, no one must simply subject herself to another’s
opinion and choice. What Kant can help us to see in this
connection is that our dependence is on the constitutional
system rather than on any private will, and that the former
system is one that ought to be designed to respect the equal
freedom of everyone.
To summarize, the great value of Kant’s philosophy of
Right is that it leads us to asking how the constitutional
system should be arranged in order to constitute a system of
equal freedom. This system should not be evaluated on the
basis of a result that is external to the system of rights and
procedures of decision making of the constitutional system
itself. Rather, the fundamental legitimacy of the system
emanates from how it relates citizens to each other, the
standing it affords them. It is readily apparent that Kant
thinks the standing required by the right to freedom as in-
dependence depends on the rule of law. In this section, I have
suggested that the constitutional system must include also
core democratic institutions such as free elections and
democratic representation. While my argument for demo-
cratic inclusion goes beyond the views of the historical Kant,
there is some textual evidence for the notion that he thought
representation through voting by citizens was an important
element of public Right. More importantly, Kantian prin-
ciples of equality and freedom as independence supply a
unique explanation of the moral importance of democratic
representation, an explanation that is based on what is re-
quired for the proper relation in which to stand to one’s
fellow citizens. The latter supplies a freedom argument for
democracy that must be distinguished from an autonomy
argument. A constitutional and representative democracy
relates citizens to each other in a way that respects their
freedom as independence even if it does not make them
individually self-legislating.
FORMALISM AND DEMOCRACY
Given Kant’s grand claim that Recht “proceeds entirely from
the concept of freedom in the external relation of people to
one another” (TP, 8:289; ﬁrst emphasis added), his deﬁnition
of freedom as independence might seem disappointingly
indeterminate and even empty. Thus, it has been argued that
the notion of freedom as independence fails to tell the leg-
islator which forms of affecting others should be legally
wrong and coercively prohibited as hindering a hindrance to
freedom. “An independent (and necessarily controversial)
account of persons’ rights is needed to knowwhat freedom as
independence is. . . . Without such an account of what those
rights are, the notion of freedom as independence is empty”
(Valentini 2012, 454).
However, this objection misunderstands the purpose of
Kant’s theory. It is a mistake to look to freedom as inde-
pendence as a foundation from which the legislator can
derive a fully adequate scheme of rights, as Andrea Sangio-
vanni (2012) and Laura Valentini (2012) do in their critical
comments on Ripstein’s Kant. What Kant supplies is some
few basic principles and an ideal account of the institutions
required by them rather than a blueprint for what the leg-
islator ought to decide. My suggestion in this section is that
when it comes to establishing the connection between free-
dom and democratic rule, the formalism of the Kantian
account turns out to be a virtue rather than a vice.
What Valentini and Sangiovanni are looking for is an
account of what we might call outcome justice, that is, an
account of which decisions the legislator ought to make. It is
important, therefore, to emphasize the procedural and in-
stitutional nature of the Kantian argument. This type of
argument does not tell us what justice concretely requires in
the sense asked for by the quest for a full account of outcome
justice. Rather, it tells us, ﬁrst, about the need for establishing
procedures and institutions that put everyone under recip-
rocal coercion and obligations. This requires a common as
opposed to a unilateral will. Second, Kant’s theory tells us
how to approach questions of justice, namely, by focusing on
the conditions of equal freedom rather than on contingent
ends of happiness, security, welfare, and the like.
The quest for a full account of outcome justice overlooks
that the normative work done by the right to freedom as
independence is to explain the need for a state in which an
indeterminate principle can be made determinate (Ripstein
2012, 489). If Kant presented a full and ﬁnal theory of out-
come justice that could explain exactly which system of
rights to enact, and even how to apply it to particular cases,
then the argument about the need for a common will and
positive law that lays down what is right would be redun-
dant. The core issue of procedural and institutional justice
would be ignored, and only the need for enforcement would
be left. However, if we overlook the importance for Kant of
the procedures through which the justice of outcomes is
determined, we fail to see the uniqueness of his approach to
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political philosophy and the contribution it can make to the
question of democratic legitimacy.
A deﬁnitive theory of outcome justice that can tell us
precisely what freedom requires, independently of the insti-
tutions that are needed to determine it, is perhaps exactly what
we should avoid. An account of outcome justice that informs
the legislator exactly about what to do would justify unilateral
action in the name of freedom, but unilateral action is itself a
violation of freedom as independence. In other words, the
objection under consideration assumes that we can conceive
freedom as independence separately from a common will and
positive law, but it thereby fails to understand the importance
of the latter for freedom itself. It is true that freedom as in-
dependence requires an account of rights, but it does not
follow that this account must be given by an independently
conceived theory of outcome justice, nor does it follow that
freedom as independence is an empty notion. We should not
confuse indeterminacy with emptiness.
Freedom as independence cannot be “ﬁlled out” by a
procedure-independent account of outcome justice without
contradicting the requirements of freedom as independence
itself. Freedom as independence requires that what counts
as Recht is determined by a common will of a particular
society. Now, this interpretation should not lead us into
thinking that whatever the sovereign decides is right. Kant
does not espouse this kind of legal positivism (Höffe 2006,
82; Wood 2002, 6). Recht has normative elements; there are
content constraints on what the sovereign can decide in
order for its commands to be proper laws or Recht. In
particular, the innate right to humanity requires that citi-
zens’ humanity is respected, that citizens are treated as
persons with purposes of their own, and that they are se-
cure in the enjoyment of what is their own, without “owing
[this] . . . to the choice of another among the people” (MM,
6:314).
The argument in this section indicates the need for
institutions and procedures for determining the common
will and, thus, opens up the possibility that democratic
deliberation and decision making are required by respect
for freedom. Indeed, because of its institutional and pro-
cedural character, the Kantian argument is more open to
democratic deliberation about the requirements of freedom
than is the quest for a prepolitical speciﬁcation of freedom
and rights.
FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY
Above, I have reconstructed the Kantian approach to polit-
ical authority and legitimacy in order to show its uniqueness.
This section suggests that this approach can enhance con-
temporary debates in democratic theory regarding the via-
bility of “freedom arguments” for democracy.7 I demon-
strate the Kantian contribution by engaging arguments that
are skeptical toward explaining democratic legitimacy with
reference to freedom. In particular, I argue that those who
reject freedom arguments for democracy have a too narrow
understanding of what freedom arguments can be, by as-
suming that we must rely either on a conception of freedom
as moral self-legislation or on a libertarian idea of freedom
as noninterference. The common problemwith both of these
is that they disconnect the discussion of freedom and de-
mocracy from the idea of a public legal order and a consti-
tutional system within which alone equal freedom is even
conceivable.
The turn to Kant’s philosophy of Right indicates how
freedom arguments can bemade independently of the idea of
autonomy as an ideal of internal willing. It suggests also that,
in asking about the rightness of political-legal institutions,
we should not look to the external beneﬁts that they effect
from the perspective of the individual—be it welfare or the
good of being individually self-governing. Rather, we should
ask how human beings ought to be related to one another.
Political and legal institutions constitute a speciﬁc relation-
ship among persons that cannot be judged by some standard
that is fully conceived independently of these institutions
themselves. Most importantly, it is the public legal order that
must express and respect the standing of each citizen as free
in the sense of not having another person as a master.
Freedom as independence neither is an ideal that is realized
by limiting the reach of law through moral rights, as in lib-
ertarianism, nor is an ideal that is expressed by a moral ideal
of collective self-legislation. Rather, freedom as indepen-
dence is a more complex ideal that requires a form of gov-
ernment with different elements that together constitute a
system of equal freedom. This form of government is a
constitutional and representative democracy.
On this background, we can confront what is often
thought to be the main obstacle to any attempt to make a
freedom argument for democracy, namely, “the incompati-
bility problem” or the incompatibility between democracy
and self-government. In the words of Allen Buchanan (2003,
17–18), “It is simply false to say that an individual who
participates in a democratic decision-making process is self-
governing; he or she is governed by the majority. . . . An
individual can be self-governing only if he or she dictates
political decisions.” Along similar lines, Thomas Christiano
(1996, 25, 24) writes, “Democracy is a system of decision-
making where each is dependent on the assent or actions of
7. I discuss freedom arguments for democracy in Rostbøll (2015a,
2015b). The following draws on and reworks my earlier discussion.
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many others to secure what they want.” This dependence is
“a paradigmatic case of unfreedom.” And Philippe Van
Parijs notes, quoting Mill, that “individual freedom does not
consist in the government of all by all, but in the ‘government
of each by himself ’ ” (Van Parijs 1995, 17; cf. Mill 1989, 7–8).
From a Kantian perspective, there are four points to
make about this objection. First, it assumes that freedom
arguments for democracy are necessarily autonomy argu-
ments. Second, the objection takes the perspective of the
ﬁrst-person singular rather than asking about how de-
mocracy relates citizens to one another. Third, it does not
consider the possibility that freedom could be seen as in-
ternal to a public legal order. Fourth, it reduces democracy
to the moment of majority decision making, implying that
political decisions are necessarily made by a private will and
ignoring the institutional and procedural nature of political
will formation, as well as the Kantian distinction between
person and ofﬁce.
Freedom arguments for democracy, as well as Kantian
political-theoretical arguments in general, are easily mis-
understood as involving a strong view of autonomy. They are
seen as implying either a sectarian idea of the autonomous
life as the good life or a strong idea of collective autonomy in
the sense that one can be free only if one is the author of the
laws to which one is subject. By strictly relying on Kant’s
conception of freedom from the Rechtslehre, we can avoid
both of these pitfalls. Since, in a Kantian approach, democ-
racy is not justiﬁed with reference to the realization of some
good for the individual, it is also not about realizing the good
of autonomy for the individual. My claim, therefore, is that a
Kantian approach to law and politics can show the moral
importance of democracy in a way that does not require the
strong interpretation of autonomy. Thus, even if Buchanan’s
objection has some merit when applied to a strong notion of
autonomy, it does not apply to all freedom arguments for
democracy.
When it is argued that democracy makes each person
dependent on the rest and that this is a paradigmatic case of
unfreedom, one takes the standpoint of a prelegal or pre-
constitutional situation and assumes that one can be free
there. This is a libertarian view that takes for granted what
Kant would call “wild, lawless freedom” (MM, 6:316). It is
exactly the relevance of this understanding of freedom for
public Right that Kant questions. If we begin with a notion of
equal freedom the meaning of which is internal to coercion
and law, we cannot say that it is democracy that makes us
dependent on others. For a plurality of persons living side by
side, it is their right to freedom that makes common laws
necessary. The Kantian approach regards “the dependence of
all upon a single common legislation” as a precondition of
equal freedom (PP, 8:349–50). Our question should not be
whether democracy can dissolve the dependence on recip-
rocal coercion but, rather, whether democratic decision
making is an integral part of a public legal order that
contains the conditions of equal freedom.
Critics of freedom arguments for democracy tend to as-
sume that freedom is about getting what one wants. Kantian
theory gives us good reasons to understand freedom differ-
ent from the unhindered satisfaction of desires, the Hobbes-
ian notion of freedom as nonfrustration mentioned above.
Because freedom as independence is a relational notion, it
does not concern what the individual can and cannot enjoy
from her own, isolated perspective, but, rather, on the stand-
ing she has in relation to others. We see here the importance
of the distinction between asking about the isolated value of
democracy from the perspective of the ﬁrst-person singular
and asking about how democratic procedures contribute to
the equal freedom of citizens who are dependent on a con-
stitution for their freedom.
Buchanan’s objection in effect regards democracy as
nothing more than the act of the majority of the people
imposing their private or unilateral will on the rest. In Kant,
we ﬁnd insights that can bring us beyond this view. Ac-
cording to Kant, establishing a public legal order entails rule
by a common public will rather than by a private unilateral
will. The common will is understood in procedural and in-
stitutional terms. It is the will not of a particular person but
of an institutionally deﬁned ofﬁce or a public juridical au-
thority. Moreover, the common will has a substantive ele-
ment insofar as law, to be an expression of a common will,
must be compatible with the right to equal freedom. Thus,
the common will in Kant is not merely the will of a legally
deﬁned sovereign legislator or of the majority. To be a public
and general will, it can have no purposes beyond its intrinsic
quality of maintaining a rightful condition of equal freedom.
The shortcoming of the Buchanan view is that it treats de-
mocracy as what Kant would call a “non-form” (“eine
Unform,” PP, 8:352), that is, a form of rule without a con-
stitution (Pinzani 2008, 210). However, our question is not
the legitimacy of direct and unconstitutional democracy, but
of a more complex constitutional system that includes rep-
resentation, separation of powers, and protection of funda-
mental rights.
Democracy as simple majoritarianism is inadequate, be-
cause it requires some to submit to the will of others in a way
that fails to explain what makes this will a common will
rather than a unilateral will. In order for democracy to be not
only compatible with but also required by freedom as in-
dependence, the common will must be formed in a process
that is designed to respect citizens’ standing and continued
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independence. The idea that, in democracy, some (the mi-
nority) are dependent on the will or choice of others (the
majority) is a consequence of an identiﬁcation of democracy
with a simple idea of majority rule. But if we see democracy
as a constitutional form in the way Kant sees a republic and
representative government, then we can go beyond the in-
adequate idea that democracy simply is majority rule and
instead inquire into the place of democratic decision making
within a constitutional system of equal freedom.
To say that democracy cannot be identiﬁed with simple
majoritarianism does not mean that majority decision
making should not play a prominent role in a democracy.
Indeed, the right to vote and be counted equally in the for-
mation of the decision-making majority is a necessary pro-
cedure in a constitutional system in which no one should be
the master of another. Here, we must demonstrate that the
use of the majority principle need not undermine freedom as
independence. Note that the fact that you cannot get what
you want through the political process is not a violation of
freedom as independence if you have the equal right to
participate in lawmaking as everyone else. As Philip Pettit
(2012, 177–78) has argued, if the fact that a decision goes
against you can be seen as tough luck, rather than as a result
of a will that operated independently of the process in which
you were an equal participant, then you are not dominated.
This point is strengthened by my Kantian argument, accord-
ing to which one’s freedom is constituted by the stand-
ing afforded by the constitutional system and its decision-
making procedures rather than by particular decisions. Of
course, particular decisions can violate one’s freedom as in-
dependence, but this is the case only if they violate the pro-
cedures of the constitution or violate the standing afforded
by them.
What differentiates constitutional democracy from other
constitutional forms of government is that it solicits the
involvement and participation of every citizen in the opinion
and will formation that result in the making of law. From a
Kantian perspective, not only should a democratic consti-
tution be designed to give everyone an equal opportunity to
inﬂuence the decisions; it should also aim at decisions that
are acceptable to everyone—government for the people, not
just for the majority. When we follow democratic decision-
making procedures, what is decided should not just be
something that seems right and good to a portion of the
population. Rather, political decisions should not be made
until after the completion of a process in which everyone has
been able to express, argue about, and vote for what seems
right and good to each.
The understanding of democracy outlined here, to be
sure, is a speciﬁc conception of democracy, and not every-
one’s conception of democracy. Indeed, it is a conception of
democracy that follows from a commitment to the impor-
tance of relating citizens to one another in a way that respects
their standing as free and independent beingswith opinions of
their own. Some might ﬁnd it question begging in this way to
tailor the deﬁnition of democracy to the norm that I argue
requires democracy. But, as long as my deﬁnition of democ-
racy is recognizable as a deﬁnition of democracy, the charge of
circularity can be met. Also, my claim is not that actual
constitutional democracies realize the ideal of freedom as
independence, but only that this is what ideally justiﬁes
constitutional democracy. Insofar as actual democracies do
notmirror this ideal, a Kantian would argue that they ought to
be reformed in order better to do so.
CONCLUSION
Democracy is not an ideal that can be understood or assessed
as a purely moral ideal, that is, independently of the idea and
reality of a public legal order. Like civil freedom, democracy
attains its meaning only as a constitutional ideal, that is, as an
ideal for how a plurality of persons who live side by side
should be related to one another by public, legal institutions.
We fail to understand the authority of constitutional de-
mocracy if we see it merely as an instrument for realizing an
ideal that can be conceived independently of constitutional
rights and institutions, such as moral autonomy or a liber-
tarian ideal of freedom as noninterference. These freedom
ideals are not internally related to constitutional democracy.
This, however, does not mean that all freedom arguments for
democracymust fail. The value of Kant’s philosophy of Right
is exactly the way in which it demonstrates that freedom and
the public legal order are coconstitutive. This article has
sought to lay the foundation for developing this Kantian
insight into a freedom argument for constitutional and rep-
resentative democracy.
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